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Computer network operations (CNO) can be considered a relatively new 
phenomenon being encountered in modern warfare.  Computer network operation is 
comprised of three components: computer network attack (CNA), computer network 
exploitation (CNE), and computer network defense (CND).  Computer network attack is 
defined as operations to disrupt, deny, degrade, or destroy information resident in 
computer networks, or the computers and networks themselves.  Computer network 
exploitation is the intelligence collection and enabling operations to gather data from 
target adversary automated information systems (AIS) or networks.  Finally, computer 
network defense are those measures, internal to the protected entity, taken to protect and 
defend information, computers, and networks from disruption, denial, degradation, or 
destruction.  
No longer is warfare limited to the use of kinetic weapons and conventional 
methods of war.  Computer network operations have become an integral part of our 
adversary’s arsenal and more attention must be paid to the effects of CNO activities, 
particularly CNA and CNE being conducted by our adversaries. Of the many states 
suspected of conducting active CNO activities against the United States and other nations, 
none warrants more attention than North Korea.   
This thesis presents the development of methodology using information available 
from open sources.  This work is intended to prove that a useful methodology for 
assessing the CNO capabilities and limitation of North Korea can be developed using only 
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A. PROBLEM STATEMENT  
Assessing a foreign country’s Computer Network Operations (CNO) activities is 
of high priority in the Intelligence Community (IC), particularly activities relating to 
Computer Network Attack (CNA) and Computer Network Exploitation (CNE).  
Although there is extensive classified analysis and reporting in this area, unclassified 
Internet-oriented research is likely to provide a number of key analytical insights that 
cannot be obtained from classified work alone. 
Modern warfare is changing, and network warfare or cyber-warfare is 
increasingly becoming more vital to our nation’s national interests.  With most of the 
country’s infrastructure becoming more automated and network-centric, our adversaries 
could potentially provide a crippling blow to our nation’s infrastructure via the Internet.  
Although the United States is the world leader in preparing and seriously thinking about 
cyber-warfare, we should not fall into a level of complacency.  We should continue to 




Information technology is now an integral part of modern culture and industry. 
Unfortunately this modernization leaves us vulnerable to cyber attacks.  With these 
weapons of mass disruption, irreparable damage could be inflicted on a country’s critical 
information technology (IT) and civil infrastructures. Several of our nation’s critical 
infrastructure system to include electric power generation, transmission and distribution, 
mass transit, and oil and gas refining are now being monitored and controlled by 
networked systems using supervisory control and data acquisition (SCADA) devices 
[GAO 04].  These SCADA systems are vulnerable to attack as they are often bridged 
with other IT systems in order to provide remote access to the networks and instant 
access to critical data regarding the status of systems. 
Cyber attacks on critical government and civilian computer systems are becoming 
more prevalent as more systems are joining the “information superhighway” [Connole 
2 
98].  Several foreign states are suspected of conducting CNO against the United States 
and other nations’ IT infrastructures.  North Korea has long been suspected of conducting 
or sponsoring various CNO activities.  A methodology for assessing a foreign country’s 
CNO activities could provide invaluable insight into North Korea’s CNO capabilities, 
limitations, and modus operandi. 
 
C. OBJECTIVES 
This thesis serves to develop a standard research methodology necessary to assess 
North Korea’s CNO activities from open sources. 
Given the history of high diplomatic and political tensions between the United 
States and North Korea it is most prudent that the Democratic People’s Republic of 
Korea (DPRK) be the focus of this research.  For years it has been reported that the 
DPRK has expressed great interest in the research and development of CNA capabilities. 
The goal of this study is to assess North Korea’s CNO activities using open 
sources, including those available through the Internet.  This research will identify and 
analyze relationships between key people and organizations involved in CNO activities, 
including CNO planning, operations, research, and education.  This study will examine 
CNO activity in government, civilian and military organizations, non-government entities 
including educational institutions and private industry, non-state organizations the foreign 
country may be supporting, and CNO-oriented relationships with other foreign countries. 
Often times the key indicators and precursors to CNO activities that are state 
sponsored are unclassified and available on the Internet.  This thesis intends to carefully 
examine several categories of information that directly or indirectly contribute to our 
understanding of the CNO capabilities, limitations, and intentions of North Korea.  This 
research will develop a methodology for assessing a foreign country’s CNO activities.  
The methodology will identify the critical information points necessary to assess North 






D. THESIS ORGANIZATION 
Seven chapters comprise this thesis: 
• Chapter I – Introduction: Establishes the goals for the thesis.  Identifies the 
motivation and purpose behind conducting this research. 
 
• Chapter II – Background: Provides information on North Korea’s IT 
infrastructure, capabilities, and limitations.  Briefly discusses laws and 
regulations associated with Internet use. 
 
• Chapter III – Academic Activity and Public Community: Discusses the 
involvement of North Korean academia with respect to CNO activities.  
Discusses the IT educational opportunities made available to students and the 
military. 
 
• Chapter IV – External Information Technology Aid: Discusses the IT aid 
provided to North Korea.  Briefly discusses the export restrictions that apply 
to North Korea. 
 
• Chapter V – Government Activity: Examines whether North Korea is training 
cyberwarriors and whether it has incorporated CNA/E in its military doctrine. 
 
• Chapter VI – Computer Network Attack/Exploitation Activity: Examines and 
discusses suspected or reported CNA/E activities associated with North 
Korea. 
 
• Chapter VII – Conclusions and Recommendations: Explains the conclusions 

























This chapter provides a detailed overview of North Korea’s information 
technology infrastructure, along with a brief discussion of the laws and regulations 
associated with Internet use in North Korea.  
 
B. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE 
Information technology is still relatively new to North Korea.  Kim Il Sung first 
introduced the technology in the early 1980s when the DPRK took the initiative of 
establishing an integrated circuit (IC) factory that later led to the development of its first 
indigenous personal computer (PC), the Bongwha 4-1[Hayes 02].  By the mid 1980s the 
DPRK had established the Pyongyang Informatics Center (PIC) with the primary 
objective of software research and development.  The PIC successfully developed several 
Korean based software products to include word processing and desktop publishing 
applications.  Fast-forward 16 years to April 2002 when at the Computer Software Expo 
of DPRKorea in Beijing the DPRK unveiled its domestically developed operating system 
along with a mix of speech recognition and character recognition software [ITWorld 02].   
There have been significant developments in the hardware sector since the 
development of the 8-bit Bongwha 4-1 PC prototype in 1982.  The DPRK is now 
reported to be manufacturing 16-bit and 32-bit PCs and to have successfully developed 
16-megabit IC chips.  An IC pilot plant was constructed at the Electronics Research 
Institute of the Academy of Science and the PIC is currently conducting research and 
development of a 64-bit microcomputer. 
1. Telecommunications 
Automatic switching networks were introduced in North Korea in the 1970’s with 
limited use in Pyongyang, Siniju, Hamhng, and Hyesan.  In 1985 there were a reported 
30,000 telephones in use in the DPRK compared to the 1.1 million in use today [CIA 04].  
These telephones were primarily available at factories, government offices, cooperatives, 
and other workplaces [LOC 93].  Satellite communication was also introduced in the mid 
1980’s with the construction of a satellite ground station near Pyongyang utilizing the 
6 
International Telecommunications Satellite Corporation (Intelsat) Indian Ocean satellite 
and one Russian satellite, with the French providing most of the technical support [LOC 
93].  Due to the close monitoring and control by the government, many ordinary citizens 
do not have the privilege of a private telephone line.  International connections routed 
through Moscow and Beijing were available to high-ranking party officials and by 1989 
international direct dialing via Hong Kong became available.  By 1990 a few public 
phone booths began appearing in Pyongyang and an agreement had been reached with 
Japan to share Japan’s telecommunications satellites.  
 
Title The Number of Telephone 
Lines (Unit: 10,000) 
Telephone Lines Diffusion 
Rate (Unit: %) 
Year 1983 1992 1996 1983 1992 1996 
North Korea (DPRK)   54.0   108.9   110.0   2.8   4.8   5.0 
South Korea (ROK) 481.0 1559.4 2008.9 12.1 35.7 43.2 
        
Table 2.1: ROK and DPRK Telephone Diffusion Rate Comparison  
[From: Ho-Song 01] 
 
Title The Number of Telephone Lines and 
Cellular Subscribers per 100 Population 
Year 1990 1999 2000 
North Korea (DPRK) 2.46 2.18 2.15 
South Korea (ROK) 30.78 96.20 106.01 
 
Table 2.2: ROK and DPRK Main Telephone Lines and Cellular Subscriber 
Comparison  
[From: UN 04] 
 
Year Country The Number of Main Telephone Lines and 
Cellular Subscribers per 100 Population 
2002 South Korea (ROK)                           116.80 
2002 North Korea (DPRK)                               2.11 
2002 China                             32.78 
2002 Japan                           119.49 
2002 Russia                             36.23 
2002 United States (USA)                           113.40 
 
Table 2.3:  Sample Main Telephone Line Comparison  
[From: UN 04] 
Until banned (see below), cellular telephones were becoming more prolific in 
North Korea, especially in Pyongyang and Rason where they were initially introduced in 
November 2003.  Mobile phone users are reported to be approximately 3,000, as the 
cellular infrastructure is still in its early stages of development and the costs associated 
with the sign up and usage fees are extremely high.  According to Hwang Chol Pung, 
president of the Korea Communications Company, plans are underway to extend cellular 
phone service to all the provinces.  The company currently offers various service plans 
for cellular phones including those for a prepaid system, homepage, and E-mail services 
connected to computer websites.  The cellular phone infrastructure in the DPRK follows 
the Global System for Mobile Communication (GSM) system, which is a mainstream in 
Europe. There are plans to introduce the Code Division Multiple Access (CDMA) 
system, which is currently being used in South Korea [Beal 03].   
As of May 25, 2004 all mobile phones were banned in North Korea [AFP 04].  It 
is widely believed that North Korean officials eager to introduce mobile technology to 
the reclusive country did not foresee North Koreans being exposed to foreign culture and 
influences.  We have not seen any discussion as to the reinstatement of mobile 
technology in North Korea. 
 
 
Figure 2.1: Cellular phone models being sold in the DPRK  
[From: DPRKNTA 02] 
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 In 1997 a 27-year contracted joint venture between the Thai company Loxley 
Public Co. and the Korea Post and Telecommunication Corporation (KPTC) created the 
Northeast Asia Telephone and Telecommunications Company Limited (NEAT&T) to 
provide telecommunication services to the Rajin-Sonbong area.  NEAT&T intended to 
provide telecommunication services that covered all ranges of frequencies, 
communication lines, and media formats in the Raijin-Sonbong Free Economic and Trade 
Zone.  These services include a projected 15,000 user lines, an international gateway, 
mobile phone services, cross border China and Russia connections, and DPRK long 
distance services via Chongjin/Pyongyang.  The company also planned on the installation 
of 5,000 new telephone lines, 80 payphones, and cellular service.  Although cellular 
phones and payphones were becoming more popular in Pyongyang, it is still unclear 
whether NEAT&T completed all their objectives given the embargoes on certain 
technical equipment, the shortage of power supplies and fuel, and the lack of 
international banking facilities.  In addition, the ban imposed on cellular phones in May 
2004 could adversely affect future expansion. 
 
 
Figure 2.2: Cellular users in the city of Pyongyang  
[From: TPK 03] 
 
2. The Internet and the DPRK 
With a population of approximately 22.5 million, the reported number of North 
Koreans currently connected to the Internet remains unknown.  As of the year 2000, the 
DPRK was reported to have only one Internet Service Provider (ISP) and it was state run.  
Although the DPRK has two assigned Class C Internet Protocol (IP) address blocks with 
8 
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131,072 addresses and a registered top-level domain (kp), no activity has been reported to 
originate from these assigned IP addresses.  In July 2003 the website 
http://www.stic.ac.kp was reported to be up [Williams 03].  However, when we attempted 
to connect to it on several occasions we found it inaccessible.   
The majority of the websites associated with the DPRK on the Internet are hosted 
in Japan, China, and Australia.  The DPRK has only a handful of officially state 
sponsored published websites, all of which are hosted on servers in China and Japan. The 
DK Lotto (http://www.dklotto.com) and the Jupae Lotto (http://www.jupae.com) 
websites are the most sophisticated of these websites [McWilliams 03].  Both websites 
were developed by South Korean entrepreneur Kim Beom Hoon of Hoonnet Co., Ltd, 
and the DK Lotto website is the only website to have its server physically located in 
Pyongyang.  Other sites are used solely to spread the Party’s “juche” message to the 
masses, with the Korean Central News Agency (KCNA) (http://www.kcna.co.jp) being 
the most popular. The Korean Central News Agency is the state-run agency of the 
Democratic People's Republic of Korea that speaks for the Workers' Party of Korea and 
the DPRK government [KCNA 03].  
In May 2002, a South Korean information technology firm operated by 
businessman Kim Beom Hoon and the state-owned entity Jangsaeng opened the DPRK’s 
first Internet café in Pyongyang.  The approximate cost of sending and receiving email is 
estimated at $10.00 per hour in June 2002, down from $100.00 per hour previously 
charged in May 2002.  Because the average North Korean earns less than $50.00 per 
month, mainly visiting businessmen, tourists, and diplomats utilize the café’s Internet 
services.  Internet service is also provided in some hotels in Pyongyang; again tourists 
and diplomats are the main users.  
  
Figure 2.3: International email users are becoming more popular in Pyongyang  
[From: DPRKNTA 02, TPK 03] 
 
3. The DPRK Intranet  
North Korea today remains one of the most disconnected and isolated countries in 
the world.  Notwithstanding the DPRK’s disconnect from the Internet, it is reported to 
possess an extensive and well-developed intranet providing connectivity to government 
offices throughout the country. 
The computer became more prevalent in the DPRK in the early 1990’s, with local 
area networks (LANs) being installed in the Party’s Headquarters, research laboratories, 
and several educational institutions.  In 1996 the DPRK began developing the Kwang 
Myong (Bright Star) network using locally developed software that seems to have 
striking similarities to the Japanese version of Microsoft’s Windows operating system.  In 
June 1997 the network was installed at the Central Scientific and Technological 
Information Agency (CSTIA) and was brought online shortly after.  The network features 
a sophisticated search engine, an electronic information system, a Japanese based web 
browser, a homepage search engine, television program guides, email functions, a 
language translation system, and a data transmission system [Conner 01].  The Kwang 
Myong Network or Intranet contains mostly scientific and technological information and 




Figure 2.4: Researchers using the Kwang Myong Network  
[From: TPK 01] 
 
In 2001 it was reported that North Korea’s Pyongyang Information Center (PIC) 
had begun testing a firewall system installed between the Internet and the Intranet in 
order to screen and control the information being transmitted between the two networks 
in anticipation of a permanent linking of the two networks in the future.  These tests were 
facilitated by the installation of a superhighway communication device using a “T-Line” 
installed by Gigalink Limited at PIC.  It was also reported that test emails utilizing “kp” 
email addresses were also conducted [Kwan 01].  In addition, researchers have begun 
encrypting information being transmitted via the Intranet.  It is believed that the encoding 
is aimed at blocking outside hacking once the Intranet is finally connected to the Internet 
[Kwan 01]. 
 
4. DPRK Electrical Infrastructure 
North Korea’s electrical infrastructure is so antiquated and in such a state of 
disrepair that it is difficult to conceive formidable and sustained computer network 
operations being conducted in the DPRK.  Judging from its current state, it is hard to 
imagine that North Korea had one of the most developed electrical networks in Asia 
during calendar year 1980.  At the time it could generate 25 billion kilowatt hours (kwh)  
11 
annually with a capacity of 5.4 million kilowatts (kw).  Today the system is obsolete and 
operates at less than 50% capacity, falling way short of the demand being dictated by the 
population [FAS 00].   
The DPRK’s electrical grid is comprised of 62 power plants, 58 sub-stations, and 
11 regional transmission and dispatching centers, all operating without the aid of 
computer systems or automation.  As a result, the power system suffers from poor 
frequency control, poor power factors, and frequent power outages [Hayes 95].  In 
Pyongyang the power received is usually weak and intermittent, often times dropping 
from 220 volts to 140-150 volts [Dubrovin 03].  The DPRK has been soliciting additional 
electrical power from South Korea since the year 2000, but this effort could prove to be 
futile given the antiquated electrical grid of the DPRK.   
Stable and reliable power is needed not only to conduct computer network 
operations, but also to manufacture the IT systems and components needed to carry out 
such operations.  Until North Korea solves its electricity supply problems, it will be 
unable to conduct sustained active computer network operations. 
 
 
Figure 2.5: Satellite picture of Southeast Asia at night  





Figure 2.6:  Power availability comparison of ROK and DPRK  
[After: GS 04] 
 
C. COMPUTER HARDWARE INDUSTRY 
North Korea pilot-tested the production of 4-bit computers in the late 1960’s.  
From the 1980’s to early 1990’s, the Academy of Sciences and the Kim Il Sung 
University assembled PC-level 8-bit computers.  North Korea's hardware production all 
but stopped when the Pyongyang Electronic Calculator Factory (built in the mid-1990’s) 
was shut down.  The hardware sector is technologically dated, with most hardware such 
as computer systems and communications equipment being imported from China and 
Southeast Asia [NIS 02]. 
Although North Korea now spends approximately 3-4% of its Gross National 
Product (GNP) on science and technology, it still lacks sufficient resources to fully fund a 
complete computer hardware industry, including large-scale semiconductor production.  
In May 1992, the DPRK requested funding through the United Nations Industrial 
Development Organization (UNIDO) to augment the cost of IT research and 
development.  The request for electronic computers in the amount of US$2.4M was used 
to produce approximately 20,000 units of 32-bit PCs per year. 
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UNIDO Project Number Project Description Requested Funds 
DRK/020/V/92-05 Semiconductor parts  US$1.5M 
DRK/021/V/92-05 Electronic computers US$2.4M 
DRK/021/V/92-05 Digital controller devices US$6.0M 
 
Table 2.4: Information Technology Items Requested by the DPRK from UNIDO 
(May 1992)  
[From: ATIP 97] 
 
It is almost impossible to ascertain the exact types and quantity of computers the 
DPRK currently possesses.  However, the case can be made that large-scale imports of 
computers would be extremely difficult to conduct due to the current Coordinating 
Committee for Multilateral Export Controls (COCOM) and Wassenaar regulations on 
dual-use technology imports.  The Intel Pentium family of microprocessor and most 
80xxx microprocessor-based computers are restricted by these regulations.  In 1997, it 
was reported that the Korean Computer Center (KCC), PIC, and the Kim Chaek 
Technical University all had Digital Equipment Corporation (DEC) computer 
workstations and PCs imported through Japan and Singapore [ATIP 97]. 
The COCOM and Wassenaar restrictions helped to precipitate North Korea’s 
development and production of indigenous hardware and software.  The DPRK has 
successfully developed a Personal Data Assistant (PDA), the Hana-21.  Development of 
the Hana-21 began in 1998 at the Industrial and Technical Corporation (ITC) in 
cooperation with the North Korean Academy of Science and the Korea Computer Center.  
The first prototype was a system called “Koryo” which was simply an English-Korean 
and Korean-English translator taking its input from a pen [TPK 03].  The Hana-21 uses 
an original Korean operating system (OS) and offers the choice of either Chinese or 
Korean at startup, which insinuates that the product is also intended for the large Chinese 
market.   The PDA features such applications as a word processor, several dictionaries, 
and translators, with all characters corresponding to Unicode for greater interoperability.  
According to the North Korean website The People’s Korea, the DPRK released the 
Hana-21 for sale in late April 2003 and it is priced overseas at 200 Euros [TPK 03].  The 
local price of the PDA was not available. 
 
Figure 2.7: North Korea’s first locally produced Personal Data Assistant  




Figure 2.8: FVS IV Biometric System   




D. SOFTWARE INDUSTRY 
Small and medium-sized research institutions such as the KCC, the Pyongyang 
Programming Center (PPC), and Kim Il Sung University develop a significant portion of 
North Korea’s computer software.  Major research and development areas are biometric 
technology, voice recognition, automated translation programs, game programs such as 
the Go Game, and multimedia educational programs for children and students.  With the 
exception of the biometric systems, which could be used for CND, none of the publicly 
disclosed software programs developed by North Korea’s software industry is germane to 
the area of CNO.  North Korea is believed to have achieved a certain level of 
technological capability, although it seems to be unsophisticated in terms of screen 




Figure 2.9: “Tamjing”, Korean-Japanese Translation Program  





Figure 2.10: Dinga Animation Software Developed in the DPRK  
[From: ICAS 02] 
 
The DPRK sponsors the Nation Program Contest that encourages programmers 
from academia, industry, and the public sector to enter their applications for review and 
judging.  Applications such as a patent information retrieval system that is able to retrieve 
inventions and patent information from a national computer network and a data storage 
compression program were among the many contest entries in the past years.  Special 
incentive programs were offered to the award-winning programmers.  For example, a 
high school student receiving the highest award is given the opportunity to enter the 
college of choice. 
 
 
Figure 2.11: Visitors observe new software demos at student programming contest 
[From: TPK 00] 
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In 2002, North Korea once again unveiled a plethora of locally developed 
software at an exhibition in a Beijing hotel.  Software ranged from translation 
applications to video games and were developed using Western software standards for 
use on Microsoft Windows and Apple Macintosh systems [Artyukov 02].  
 
 
Figure 2.12: North Korean software exhibits at the World PC Expo in September 2001  
[From: TPK 01] 
 
North Korea is also attempting to market its software to the rest of the world 
through shell companies.  PIC-International (http://www.pic-international.com) is a 
company in Singapore that offers a wide range of DPRK developed software for both the 
PC and MAC operating systems on its website [Hoff 01].  PIC is and continues to be the 
primary information technology research institute in North Korea. 
 
E. LAWS AND REGULATIONS 
The Internet interface is still in its infancy stage of development in North Korea, 
and as most of the Western world struggles to reach some consensus on the uniformity of 
laws and regulations pertaining to Internet use, the DPRK may have a distinct advantage.  
The  DPRK  being  a  communist  state  has  established  a  plethora  of  censorship  laws  
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regarding telecommunications.  It is assumed that all telecommunications are monitored 
by the state, and the institutes currently conducting Internet research warrant special 
attention by censors. 
No established laws regarding the use of the Internet were found during the 
course of this research.  Government offices, state research facilities, and state officials 
utilize almost all of North Korea’s computers.  All international telephone connections 
are facilitated through a state run exchange operator, which is also closely monitored.  
Until individual citizens begin to own personal computers and telephones in greater 
numbers, there is probably little or no major cause for concern on the part of the state, 
hence the lack of laws and regulations. 
 
F. SUMMARY 
 This chapter provided information on the North Korean information technology 
infrastructure and related services.  Additionally, the North Korean IT industry was 
discussed in great detail.  An analysis of the data points gleaned from this portion of the 
research reveals that North Korea recognizes the importance of IT in a modern world.  
However, it is readily apparent that North Korea does not possess the necessary 
infrastructures needed to pose a formidable CNO threat.  Although the DPRK has an 
emerging hardware and software industry, the overall effectiveness of the software and 
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III. ACADEMIC ACTIVITY AND PUBLIC COMMUNITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter will examine the involvement of North Korean academia in CNO 
activities.  Educational opportunities made available to civilian students and military 
members with regard to information technology will also be carefully examined. 
 
B. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY INFRASTRUCTURE 
With the assistance of academia, in 2001 North Korea began publishing and 
distributing a substantial quantity of publications related to information technology and 
the sciences.  This was an attempt by officials to broaden the knowledge of the average 
worker and young person with respect to information technology.  Information 
technology was quickly becoming a vital national interest to the DPRK; this realization 
led to the creation of the Bright Star Network (Kwang Myong), maintained by the Central 
Scientific and Technological Information Agency (CSTIA).  This computer network is 
dedicated to science and technology.  Recent publications applicable to cutting-edge 
technological developments with commercial value are posted on the network. 
The Comprehensive Kumsung Youth Publishing House published a tome entitled 
“Solving Problems of Computer Intelligence Development” in order to familiarize 
readers with basic computer terminology and operation.  This and many other IT related 
books were published with the aid of academia aimed at stimulating the minds of young 
students and increasing the general information technology awareness throughout the 
regions of the DPRK.  However, the vast majority of these publications were simply 
introductory books and provided no real in depth knowledge of information technology. 
 
C. KWANG MYONG (BRIGHT STAR NETWORK) 
When computers began to become popular in North Korea in the early 1990’s, 
research institutions and academia were the first to have them installed.  By mid-decade 
sophisticated LANs were being developed and installed at these institutions.  The Bright 
Star Network was developed in 1996 with the objective of linking the various regional 
research facilities and academia LANs throughout North Korea.  This was the genesis of 
what is now the North Korean Intranet, which now reaches more than just academia and 
research institutions.  The government and military are now heavily connected to the 
Intranet.   
The Kwang Myong Network’s data is transmitted via fiber optic cable with a 
backbone capacity of 2.5 GB between the CSTIA and each province.  The Central 
Information Company of Science and Technology, the Invention Offices of Scientific 
Academies and the People's Study Grand Palace are among the many North Korean 
government entities that maintain databases on the network.  The sign-up fee is free in 
Pyongyang in order to promote the spread of computer networks [TPK 03]. 
Prior to becoming the national Intranet, the Kwang Myong’s content was limited 
to science and technology with over 30 million scientific documents posted on the 
network [Conner 01]. 
 
 
Figure 3.1: Users of the Kwang Myong Network in Pyongyang  







D. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY PUBLICATIONS 
North Korea first embarked on publishing and distributing considerable volumes 
of science and technology literature in 2001, with the objective of aiding its workers and 
young people acquire a broad knowledge in the field of information technology.  The 
May 2001 issue of the state-published youth magazine Vanguard Youth reported that the 
future of the science, technology, and information industries hinges on the performance 
of the young students.  The magazine was quoted to say, “Young people must study, 
study, and study to meet the requirements of the times and to improve the standard of 
science and technology development.” [NIS 02]  
The Comprehensive Science Encyclopedia Publishing House (CSEPH) published 
The Basics of Windows Programming and Beginners Visual Basics of Programming 
Language aimed at motivating young students to express an interest in computers and 
increase the general awareness of information systems throughout the country.   The 
Comprehensive Manufacturing Publishing House (CMPH) has also published books such 
as Computer Common Sense, Glossary of Computer Terminology, and Computer 
Manual.  In addition to the basic computer publications, information science and 
technology tomes such as Numerical-Type Integrated Circuits and their Applications, 
Optical Fiber Communications, and Electronic Material Handbook were published by 
the CMPH.  The Comprehensive Kumsung Youth Publishing House (CKYPH) published 
computer beginner’s guides.  These guides included Solving Problems of Computer 
Intelligence Development, a guide intended to familiarize its readers with computers.   
The Information Technology Forum for Unification, which consists of 110 South 
Korean IT professionals, was established in August 2001 to facilitate the exchange of 
ideas and technical publications with North Korean IT civilians.  In late 2001 civilian 
researchers at the Pyongyang Informatics Center (PIC) requested 250 IT books from 
South Korea [Soo-min 01].  The majority of the books requested were published between 
1999 and 2001 and focused primarily on graphics and virtual animation.   Publications on 
common operating systems and communication methods were also requested, in addition 
to the books on the multimedia sector and Motion Pictures Experts Group (MPEG) 
technology.  The North Koreans also requested a large quantity of books on language 
fonts and codes as the DPRK is committed to “Koreanizing” as much information as 
possible [Soo-min 01].  Conspicuously absent from the list of requested publications 
were books relevant to cyber security, suggesting that North Korea was more interested 
in commercial IT development rather than developing an offensive cyber force.  
There are also a few technical periodicals available in North Korea.  The scientific 
magazine Science World is a government-sponsored publication that features all the latest 
information technology and scientific innovations of North Korean scientists and 
researchers.  It was Science World that boasted the most recent developments and testing 
of the country’s Intranet. 
 
E. INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY EDUCATION 
In 1975 an eleventh grade education became mandatory, and in the early 1990’s a 
primary and secondary education became compulsory.  In the 1990’s the majority of the 
instruction provided to students consisted of mathematics, Korean language, physical 
education, drawing, and music.  Today there seems to be an emphasis placed on 
computer related subjects being taught in the DPRK starting at the grade school level. 
It has been stated several times by Kim Jong Il that information technology is the 
future of North Korea and those who are not actively educating themselves will be left 
behind.  Kim Jong Il himself is known to be an avid user of the Internet and realizes the 
importance of information technology in today’s global arena. 
 
 
Figure 3.2: North Korean Grade Level Students in an IT Lab  
[From: TPK 01] 
 
In an effort to emphasize the importance of IT, North Korea began opening computer 
science colleges with the Kimilsung University and at the Kimchaek Industrial University 
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in 1999. In April 2001 the Mankyongdae Student Palace, Pyongyang Student Boy’s 
Palace, and Kumsung First and Second Junior High Schools established specialized 
curricula designed specifically for young Koreans who demonstrated an aptitude for 
computer science [Seong-in 01].  Kids at the Mankyongdae Student Palace are being 
taught basic programming skills with such tools as Visual Basic.  In a recent visit to 
North Korea, former CNN correspondent and Beijing Bureau Chief Rebecca Mackinnon 
observed students using programming software written in English.  It was unclear 
whether they actually understood the software being demonstrated or whether the entire 




Figure 3.3: Computer Classroom in the Mangyongdae School Children’s Palace  
[From: NKZONE 04] 
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Kim Jong Il has now made computer education mandatory in North Korea.  Jong 
Il has stated that there are three basic types of fools in the 21st century: people who 
smoke, people who do not appreciate music, and people who cannot use the computer 
[Choe 03].  Today in the DPRK, possessing a computer-related job is a sign of privilege. 
According to  Tak Eun Hyok, a North Korean army defector to the South, “everyone 
wants to learn the computer, believing they can get good jobs.”   Computer science now 
tops the lists of curricula that young military officers and college students wish to study 
[Choe 03].   
 
 
Figure 3.4: Instructional Aid for Microsoft Windows in a North Korean Classroom at 
the Pyongyang 6.9 Middle School  
[From: Crowcroft 04] 
 
Plans were being made by a South Korean nonprofit organization to open an 
information technology college in Pyongyang in cooperation with the DPRK’s Education 
Ministry in 2002.  The International Foundation for Northeast Asia Education and 
Culture says that it had reached a tentative agreement with the DPRK to open the 
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institution but details still remain sketchy and the status of the institution is unknown 
[Cohen 01].  
In 2001 officials at Syracuse University in New York State developed a scholarly 
exchange program in conjunction with the DPRK’s Kim Chaek University of Technology 
(KUT) to have seven North Korean civilians study information technology at Syracuse 
University [Snyder 03].  The bilateral program focuses on the general area of information 
technology that supports the civilian sector IT infrastructure in the DPRK.  Researchers 
from KUT studied various programs which included secure fax programs, digital 
libraries, machine translation programs, decision support, watermarking programs, 
graphic communication via personal digital assistants, and the implementation of IT in 
various public sectors on their most recent visit to Syracuse [ASPAC 03].  Computer 
security was not among the list of topics studied by the visiting North Korean students.  
This collaboration is the first of its type between the two countries and Syracuse 
University intends on continuing the student exchange program.  Officials in charge of 
the program were contacted for further comment, however they refused to release any 
additional information associated with the exchange program. 
 
 
Figure 3.5: Kim Chaek University of Technology and Syracuse University Officials  




The IT education of the KPA is shrouded in more secrecy than public IT 
education.  Very little is known about the IT education of the KPA, however, the Asia-
Pacific Center for Security Studies (APCSS) reported that the KPA is rapidly evolving 
into a “modestly digitized” army [APCSS 02].      
 
F. NORTH KOREAN ACADEMIA AND IT RESEARCH  
There are three major academic research institutions in the DPRK actively 
involved in the discipline of information technology.   The three institutions are the 
Pyongyang University of Computer Technology (PUCT), Kim Chaek University of 
Technology (KUT), and Kim Il Sung University. 
 
1. Pyongyang University of Computer Technology (PUCT) 
Pyongyang University of Computer Technology was founded in 1985 and since 
its inception has produced over 4,000 Computer and IT engineers.  The three-year 
university has a faculty that specializes in computer and information technology and its 
graduates are now playing a vital role in the development and production of information 
technology in various sectors of the DPRK’s national economy [KCNA 02]. 
 
2. Kim Chaek University of Technology (KUT) 
Kim Chaek University of Technology (KUT) was originally part of the Kim Il 
Sung University before it was established as the Pyongyang College of Technology in 
1948.  The university boasts 10 research institutes and 54 laboratories with a student 
body of approximately 10,000 and a faculty of approximately 2,000 [MIIS 03].  KUT is 
well known for its development of various software and artificial intelligence.  Faculty 
members are often solicited to provide information technology lectures to high-ranking 
Party officials [TPK 01].  
 
 
Figure 3.6: The DPRK’s hopeful engineers and scientists being produced at the Kim 
Chaek University of Technology  
[From: TPK 01] 
 
The North Korean website The People’s Korea reported in 2001 that KUT has 
been training engineers who will contribute to the future development of the DPRK’s 
information technology.  The Computer Engineering department at KUT is planning on 
the introduction of state-of-the-art technology needed to modernize computer facilities 
related to economic construction.  The present task at KUT is to upgrade its voice 
recognition technology to a world-class level [TPK 01].  
 
3.  Kim IL Sung University 
Kim Il Sung University was established in October 1946 at the foot of Moran 
Hill.  It is the DPRK’s first university and today it serves as a model for other universities 
throughout North Korea.  It has approximately 10 institutes consisting of electronic 
computers, cell engineering, and atomic energy with more than 1200 distinguished 




Figure 3.7: War-damaged Kim Il Sung University in 1953  
[From: KCNA 96] 
 
Kim Il Sung University has an extensive and challenging computer science 
curriculum offering a plethora of computer programming courses.  The faculty has 
developed and produced several software products, including the program protection 
software Intelligent Locker, Worluf Anti-Virus, a Chinese character editing program, 




This chapter examined the extent of North Korean academia’s participation in the 
development of information technology and CNO activity.  Although at times it was 
difficult to discern the distinction between academia and state agency, it was determined 
that several academic institutions play an integral role in the accomplishment of the 
DPRK’s overall IT strategic objectives.  Many of these institutions are developing and 
producing state-of-the-art software for both the domestic and international market.  It was 
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unclear whether or not these institutions were actively participating in CNO activities 
sponsored by the DPRK.  It was also unclear whether or not these institutions were 
engaged in the development of software relevant to CNO.  There is strong evidence that 
North Korea academia is heavily involved in information technology development but 
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IV. EXTERNAL INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY AID 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter explores the information technology aid provided to North Korea.  It 
also briefly discusses the export restrictions that apply to North Korea. 
 
B. DPRK’S MAJOR IT CONTRIBUTORS 
Despite the technological advances being made in the area of information 
technology, much of North Korean current information technology is acquired from other 
nations willing to provide the neo-isolated state with the technology. 
 
1. India 
India has been one of the DPRK’s largest contributors of information technology, 
providing training to North Korean information technology professional at the Indian 
Institute of Technology in Dehli [Hayes 02].  The Indian technology firm Electronic 
Trade and Technology Development Corporation (ETTDC) was awarded a $5.9 million 
contract by UNIDO in 1981 to supply information technology equipment to North Korea.  
The firm was primarily selected for the contract because it had experience circumventing 
COCOM restrictions and was planning on using western suppliers [Hayes 02].  The bulk 
of ETTDC’s UNIDO contract was to build North Korea’s first IC plant and provide the 
required training needed to operate the plant.  However, due to a language barrier the 
training was grossly insufficient and the plant was only able to produce limited numbers 




China continues to be one of North Korea’s staunchest allies and provides a 
significant amount of information technology aid to the DPRK.  North Korea’s limited 
email service provided by www.silibank.com is being facilitated through an Internet 
connection in China.  Kim Jong Il was reported to have visited China twice to closely 
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study China’s information technology reforms.  He was also reported to have visited 
Legend Computers, Ltd. in Shanghai [KN 01]. 
North Korea proudly exhibited its newly developed software products at the 
North Korea Computer Software Expo in Beijing in April 2002.  The DPRK is also a 
regular participant in the Chinese annual computer trade show Comdex. 
 
3. Russia 
Our research did not find any information with regard to the type and quantity of 
information technology aid officially provided by Russia.  However, after more than a 
decade of strained diplomatic relations, North Korea has resumed a dialogue with Russia.  
In 2001 a North Korean Defense Ministry delegation visited Russia to discuss military 
cooperation and military industrialization [PD 01].  
 
4. Japan 
 The aid provided by Japan is more indirect in nature.  Although trade talks 
between Japan and the DPRK have resumed, Japan continues to honor the COCOM and 
Wassenaar regulations.  However, Japan hosts a large number of the DPRK’s official 
websites used to spread the Party’s message.  Several of the DPRK’s official websites 
originate from websites with a .jp top-level domain name.  As noted earlier, the KCNA, 
which is North Korea’s most prominent website, is hosted in Tokyo by the Korea News 
Service (KNS).  Japanese officials must be aware of the IT services being provided to the 
DPRK, however this research has not been able to uncover any evidence that Japan is 
taking steps to prevent such actions. 
 
5. South Korea 
South Korea has one the world’s highest computer diffusion rates.  Although 
tensions still exist between the DPRK and the ROK stemming from North Korean 
Internet gambling sites being fed into the South, South Korean IT businesses are eager to 
invest in the underdeveloped North Korean IT industry.  Several South Korean 
businesses have made major investments in the North Korean IT infrastructure. 
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In 2001 construction began on the first inter-Korean IT facility in North Korea, 
Koryo Business Town.  The South Korean IT firm, Ntrack, in cooperation with the North, 
planned on building a 17,820 square meter IT complex in Pyongyang, with enough space 
for over 2,500 North Korean IT workers.  The complex will be home to a 1,650 square 
meter IT research facility specializing in animation and web products [Nautilus 01].  An 
inter-Korean joint venture company was also launched in 2001 in Dandong, China.  The 
Hana Program Center was established on May 10, 2001.  This was reported as the first 
time that workers from both North and South Korean IT industries met to market 
software [Seong-in 01].  
The South Korean multimedia and IT firm BIT Computer Corporation announced 
in June 2001 that the company would be providing a satellite Internet link between the 
shut-in country and the rest of the world.  As part of the inter-Korean deal, BIT Computer 
Corporation will be the sole supplier of satellite Internet equipment in North Korea for 
five years.  In addition, BIT was also in the process of providing IT training to North 
Korean personnel via the Internet at www.bitcampus.com.  According to BIT president 
Cho Hyun-jung, the company will also provide the Choson Computer Center with IT 
books and manuals and emphasize that the entire venture is being conducted with the 
expressed approval of Kim Jong Il [CDES 01]. 
In June 2004 at the request of North Korea, a group of North Korean officials 
toured SK Telecom, South Korea’s largest mobile carrier, and Samsung Electronics, 
South Korea’s largest manufacturer of memory chips.  This visit would imply that the 
North is looking to the South for ideas in expanding its own fledgling IT sector given the 
South’s success with IT growth in the last decade.  Computer technology has been a top 
priority in the North for several years now, and Kim Jong Nam, the eldest son of Kim 
Jong Il, is leading the campaign to arm its military with state of the art information 
technology [WT 04]. 
Officially, South Korea still bans the export of Pentium© class computers to 
North Korea.  Many in Seoul fear the possibility of equipping the enemy with equipment 




C. COCOM AND WASSENAAR RESTRICTIONS 
In an attempt to restrict trade with the former Soviet Union and the Warsaw Pact 
countries, the United States and its allies created the Coordinating Committee for Multi-
lateral Export Controls (COCOM) in 1949.  By November 1993 COCOM had outlived its 
usefulness and had become inadequate.  At a meeting in The Hague, the 17 COCOM 
members agreed to terminate COCOM and establish a new multilateral arrangement.  
The Wassenaar Arrangement (WA) formerly replaced COCOM in July 1996 [UNVIE 
04]. The 33 founding members of the Wassenaar Arrangement are: Argentina, Australia, 
Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, Canada, the Czech Republic, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Germany, Greece, Hungary, Ireland, Italy, Japan, Republic of Korea, Luxembourg, the 
Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Romania, the Russian Federation, 
the Slovak Republic, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, Turkey, Ukraine, the United Kingdom, 
and the United States.  The WA restrictions were considered to be a more proficient tool 
to deal with the export of both conventional munitions and dual-use goods and 
technology to non-member nations.   
According to a U.S. State Department release in 1996, the purpose of the 
Arrangement reflected in the Initial Elements agreed to at the meeting is to contribute to 
regional and international security. This is accomplished by promoting transparency and 
greater responsibility with regard to transfers of conventional arms and dual-use goods 
and technologies, thus preventing destabilizing accumulations; seeking, through national 
policies, to ensure that transfers of these items do not contribute to the development or 
enhancement of military capabilities which undermine these goals and are not diverted to 
support such capabilities; complementing and reinforcing, without duplication, the 
existing control regimes for weapons of mass destruction and their delivery systems, as 
well as other internationally recognized measures designed to promote transparency and 
greater responsibility, by focusing on the threats to international and regional peace and 
security which may arise from transfers of armaments and sensitive dual-use goods and 
technologies where risks are judged greatest; and, enhancing cooperation to prevent the 
acquisition of armaments and sensitive dual-use items for military end-uses, if the 
situation in a region or the behavior of a state is, or becomes, a cause for serious concern 
to the Participating States [USDOS 96].  
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This arrangement will not be directed against any particular state or group of 
states and will not impede bona fide civil transactions. Nor will it interfere with the rights 
of states to acquire legitimate means with which to defend themselves pursuant to Article 
51 of the Charter of the United Nations [USDOS 96]. 
North Korea and its staunch ally to the North, China, are noticeably not 
signatories to the WA, which bars IT-related export to North Korea.  The WA classifies 
North Korea as a terrorism-sponsoring nation, prohibiting the export of dual-use 
technologies to the nation.  Under the current guidelines of WA the export of digital 
computers to North Korea having a composite theoretical performance (CTP) exceeding 
190,000 millions of theoretical operations per seconds (MTOPS) is strictly prohibited 
without the issuance of a license.  Additionally, the licenses are not issued to military or 
state entities in the DPRK and are routinely denied [WA 03].  The U.S. Department of 
Commerce (DOC) enforces even stricter guidelines regarding the export of computer 
technology to North Korea.  The DOC mandates that a license be issued for the export of 
digital computers having a CTP exceeding 6 MTOPS or microprocessors with a clock 
frequency rate exceeding 25 MHz.  Furthermore, the DOC restricts the export of the very 
technology needed to manufacture microprocessors and computers.  Any computer 
containing U.S. technology is also restricted [DOC 04].   Despite both COCOM and WA 
restrictions and countless U.S. sanctions on dual-use technologies, North Korea has 
managed to acquire more basic computing power than the United States possessed during 
the Manhattan Project.  The restrictions and sanctions have merely slowed the quantity 
and timing of production of computer and related equipment provided to economic actors 
throughout the country.  The leading members of the Party and various high-level 
government officials have always had access to current or next generation computers 
[Seong-in 01].  The level of advancement made in such areas as nuclear power, satellite, 
and missile technologies indicated that the DPRK possesses sufficient computing power 
to accomplish complex operations.  This should not come as a surprise as the Asia-
Pacific Center for Security Studies reported in 2001 that Chinese-made Pentium 




D. THE NORTH KOREA-CHINA RELATIONSHIP 
The relationship between North Korea and China has evolved over time.  China 
has long been an outspoken ally of North Korea and supported them during the Korean 
War.  During the period of 1973-1984, China’s support for North Korea increased 
steadily amidst a significant decline in Soviet support [LOC 04]. 
In the aftermath of the Tiananmen Square incident in 1989, Pyongyang supported 
Beijing’s response to the incident.  By the early 1990s, the relationship between North 
Korea and China had grown much warmer.  However, although Pyongyang and Beijing 
become closer allies, Beijing has not transferred any major weapons systems to North 
Korea. 
Kim Jong Il has made several visits to China in the recent years in an effort to 
bolster the relationship between the two countries.  North Korea recognizes the 
magnitude of the Chinese IT market and as a result most software programs developed in 
the DPRK target the vast Chinese market.  North Korea is a regular participant in the 
Chinese IT expos and Beijing played host to a North Korean software exhibition in 2002.  
In 2004 North Korea established a software development facility in the Chinese province 
of Shenyang. 
Although it was reported by the Asia-Pacific Center for Security Studies that 
Chinese-made Pentium computers were present in North Korea, the quantity is unknown.  
It is also unclear as to the type and quantity of IT equipment exported from China to 
North Korea.  Given the fact that China is not a participating member of WA, it would 
not be unfair to speculate that China has provided North Korea with the necessary IT 
equipment and training needed to improve its IT infrastructure and CNO prowess.  
China’s IT sector is considered comparable to the United States’ and following the 
assumption that China and North Korea are engaged in the free trade of information 
technology, the WA is not dramatically hindering North Korea’s IT development and 
growth.  
 
E. THE CHINESE IT INDUSTRY AT A GLANCE 
According to the State Development and Reform Commission (SDRC), China has 
developed the world’s third largest manufacturing industry of electronic and IT products 
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surpassing that of Japan.   In 2003, China’s IT manufacturing industry reported sales 
revenues totaling US$227 billion, a 34 percent increase from the previous year.  China’s 
export of desktop computers is estimated to reach 20 million units by 2007, rising from 
2003’s exports of 11.21 million units [China 04]. 
China built its first computer based on a Soviet model in 1958.  In the late 1970s, 
China began producing computers for commercial and industrial uses soon after 
microcomputers were in production.  The newly manufactured computers relied heavily 
on imported components and were developed in small quantities [Kraemer/Dedrick 02].  
Today, China’s IT sector is relatively advanced and produces a wide range of products 
for both export and domestic use. PDA’s, PC’s, monitors, CPU’s, and a myriad of 
peripheral devices are among the many IT products being produced by China.  With such 
a large and cheap labor market, several PC manufacturers have established several joint 
ventures with Chinese IT companies.  Hewlett-Packard, Toshiba, and Compaq have 
formed joint ventures with local companies to market their own products and gain access 
to local distribution channels [Kraemer/Dedrick 02].  Companies like IBM, Dell, Acer, 
and Siemens have launched IT ventures of their own in China, manufacturing desktop 
and notebook PCs, monitors, storage products, motherboards, servers, networking 
equipment, and various peripheral devices.  Table 4.1 lists the major foreign PC makers, 
their Chinese joint venture partners, and their products. 
 
 Table 4.1:  Major Foreign PC Companies Activities in China  
[From: Kraemer/Dedrick 02] 
  
Nine years ago the Asian Technology Information Program (ATIP) reported that 
computer applications were still in an early stage in China.  China had managed to 
develop some supporting software and applications software, such as spread sheets, 
accounting software, word processors, desktop publishing, CAD/CAM, multimedia, 
Chinese operating systems, and antivirus applications [ATIP 95].  Today China is 
concentrating its software research and development in machine translation, Chinese 
character recognition, voice composition, automatic code generation, distributed 
processing systems, parallel processing, and pattern recognition [Joseph 02].  In 2001, 
Chinese government officials projected that the country’s software exports would be 
approximately US$1.5-2 billion by 2005 [AU 03].  We were unable to find any evidence 
that China is engaged in the research and development of software programs pertinent to 
computer network operations.   The fact that there is no evidence of such CNO tools does 
not negate the fact that China has been accused of conducting CNO activities against 
other states, nor does it mean that China may not be developing CNO tools that we did 
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not uncover.  Moreover, there is ample evidence that Chinese military theorists are well 
aware of the potential value of CNO [Thomas 00]. 
 
 
Figure 4.1: Basic Chinese IT Rankings  
[From: AU 03] 
 
F. CHINESE CNO ACTIVITIES 
Although the U.S. and China officially deny the idea of Chinese state sponsored 
cyber warfare against Taiwan or the U.S., the Central Intelligence Agency (CIA) believes 
that the Chinese military is currently researching ways to disrupt targeted civilian and 
military computer and infrastructure systems using virus attacks.  A CIA assessment 
likened China’s virus attack abilities to those of technically advanced hackers, however, 
these abilities are currently limited to temporarily disabling sectors of Internet users 
[Lyman 02]. 
 China has never publicly stated its involvement in CNO activities against its 
adversaries.  However, the exploits of Chinese hackers are well known on the Internet. 
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Soon after the 1999 accidental bombing of the Chinese embassy in Belgrade, Chinese 
hackers unleashed a barrage of computer network attacks and exploitation against various 
U.S. government systems.  Intruders claiming to be from Mainland China defaced the 
websites of the U.S. Departments of Energy and Interior, among others.  The webpages 
displayed the message “We are Chinese hackers who take no care about politics”.  
Officials reported that the hack of the Interior Department was definitely traced back to 
China [Messmer 99].  In 2001, Business Week reported that Chinese hackers had 
infiltrated several U.S. government websites to express their outrage regarding the 
collision of a U.S. EP-3 surveillance aircraft with a Chinese fighter.  The U.S. Labor and 
Health and Human Services Departments were both victims of website defacement 
[France 01].  The Chinese hacker group Honker Union of China claimed responsibility 
for several of the webpage defacements [Ward 01]. 
 
 
Figure 4.2: A Message Reportedly Used by Chinese Hackers  
[From: Ward 01] 
 
In July 2004, South Korea’s spy agency the NIS confirmed the identities of 
Chinese hackers who were suspected of attacking the computer systems of 10 South 
Korean government agencies.  According to the NIS, one of the Chinese hackers was 
enrolled in a Korean language class at a foreign language school in China that has been 
run by the Chinese People’s Liberation Army since 1986 [Song-wu 04].  The Japanese 
newspaper Mainichi Shimbun reported in August 2004 that a group of Chinese hackers 
had launched an attack on about 200 Japanese and Taiwanese websites.  The group 
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reported posted messages on its website calling for people to attack Japanese servers 
[MDN 04]. 
Chinese hackers are becoming more imaginative with their activities and are now 
offering made to order virus services.  The Chinese anti-virus software firm Rising PR 
reported that Chinese hackers are upgrading existing viruses enabling them to subvert 
anti-virus applications [CCRC 04].  North Korea could very well be taking advantage of 
these services being offered by Chinese hackers.        
 
G. SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the information technology aid provided to North Korea.  
The COCOM and Wassenaar restrictions and their effectiveness were also examined 
highlighting the restrictions placed on North Korea’s import of dual-use technology.  
Additionally, an overview of China’s IT industry was discussed as China is not a 
signatory of the COCOM and Wassenaar restrictions.  Hence, North Korea would 
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V. GOVERNMENT ACTIVITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines whether North Korea includes CNA/E in its military 
doctrine and whether it is training cyberwarriors.  It also examines the state run 
companies involved in information technology and state propaganda on the Internet. 
 
B. GOVERNMENT ENTITIES INVOLVED IN DPRK IT DEVELOPMENT 
Within the last decade, North Korea has expressed a keen interest in the IT sector.  
North Korea’s interest in the IT sector is directly related to its goal in constructing 
Kangsong Taeguk, a powerful nation [Seong-in 01].  More focus has been placed on IT 
development since Kim Jong Il assumed power and according to the North Korean 
Central Television Broadcasting Station in May 2001, “Kim Jong Il promises a bright 
future for the IT industry”.  
In March 2004, North Korea established the “Korea 6•15 Service Office in 
Shenyang” in the Liaoning Province of China.  The software producer is the first of its 
kind in Shenyang, and the home offices of the “Korea 6•15 Editing Corporation” in the 
DPRK closely control its operation.  The company plans on developing programs for the 
printed media and will offer specially tailored software based on its customer’s requests. 
Korea 6•15 announced that it would provide software that satisfies the demand from 
Chinese consumers at competitive prices [LKD 04]. 
Today in the DPRK there are seven key research institutions focusing on 
information technology.  These institutions are primarily responsible for the significant 
progress made by North Korea in the information technology sector.  The four primary 
research institutions actively pursuing information technology are Pyongyang Informatics 
Center (PIC), Korea Computer Center (KCC), DPRK Academy of Sciences, and Silver 
Star Laboratories (UNBYOL). 
 
1. Pyongyang Informatics Center (PIC) 
The PIC was established on July 15, 1986 with the purpose of developing 
computer-based modern management techniques.  The PIC was also to aid in the 
formation of a Computer Group, whose purpose was to promote the use of computers by 
government and industry [Hayes 02].  Today the PIC employs over 200 qualified 
software engineers whose average ages is 28 years with 1.5 computers per person [Park 
01].  The PIC primarily focuses on software development and is responsible for the 
development of the General Korean Electronic Publication Systems, 3D CAD, embedded 
Linux software, web applications, interactive programs, accounting software, and more 
recently virtual reality software.  It is reported that the PIC is responsible for developing 
the filters to be used between the Kwang Myong Intranet and the Internet. 
 
 
Figure 5.1: Pyongyang Informatics Center  
[From: Hayes 02] 
 
The PIC was described as well endowed with computer hardware and strong in 
software generation [Hayes 02].  In 2001, the PIC’s primary software programs were 




Figure 5.2: Programmers at the Pyongyang Informatics Center  
[From: ATIP 97] 
 
2. Korea Computer Center (KCC) 
The KCC was established in 1990 by Kim Il Sung to promote computerization in 
the DPRK.  At its inception, the KCC employed approximately 800 employees who 
appeared to have an average age of 26 [Larmer 04].  Today Kim Jong Il’s son Kim Jong 
Nam, who also heads North Korea’s intelligence service, the State Security Agency 
(SSA), heads the KCC.  Kim Jong Nam is also the chairman of North Korea’s Computer 
Committee.  In May 2001 the South Korean newspaper The Chosun Ilbo reported that 
Kim Jong Nam had moved the SSA’s overseas intelligence gathering unit, which 
operates primarily by hacking and monitoring foreign communications, into the KCC 
building.  In 2001, South Korean media reported that the KCC was nothing less than the 
command center for Pyongyang’s cyber warfare industry, masquerading as an innocuous, 




Figure 5.3: Korea Computer Center  
[From: TPK 00] 
 
The KCC now develops some of North Korea’s cutting edge software, which 
includes voice recognition systems, fingertip identification systems, and artificial 
intelligence systems.  In the year 2000, researchers at the KCC successfully created a 
Korean version 1.0 of the Linux operating system.  The KCC has also developed a 
Korean typewriting program that interfaces with Windows and Mac operating system for 
use in offices throughout the country.  The program was named “Our Company” and 
enables North Koreans to input Korean text in Windows and Mac OS applications [TPK 
01].   
For the past several years the KCC has dominated Japan’s annual FOST 
competition, a tournament for computers playing Chinese chess [AP 03].  The KCC 
exports much of its software through its Beijing office and is currently contracted by 
several South Korean companies to provide a wide range of software.  It was reported by 
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an official at South Korea’s Samsung, who paid $730,000 for five KCC-developed 
programs, that the KCC programmers do not have a lot of access to the outside world, but 




Figure 5.4: Programmers inside the Korea Computer Center  
[From: TPK 01] 
 
3. DPRK Academy of Sciences 
Established in 1952 as the Ministry of Science and Technology, the Academy of 
Sciences provides leading scientific research work and unified guidance on national 
scientific and technical administrative work [UNDP 00].  Located in the Eunjong District 
of Pyongyang, the Academy of Sciences’ most basic mission is to produce scientific and 
technologies research and development.  The Academy has produced such software 
programs as Pidulgi, a multilingual conversation study program; Mae a Korean language 
optical character recognition (OCR) program; Mangnami-kong, an artificial intelligence 
development program; and Mujigae, a Japanese-English translation program [TPK 00].  
Due to a lack of research funding, the Academy of Sciences research has become 
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dismally limited with more of an emphasis being place on physics and mathematics 
instead of information technology [NIS 02]. 
4. Silver Star Laboratories (Unbyol) 
The Silver Star Laboratories (SSL) was established in 1995 under the Korean 
Unbyol General Trading Corporation.  According to Kang Yong Jun, the director of SSL, 
the average age of the researchers at SSL is 26 years, with most graduating from Kim Il 
Sung University and other distinguished universities across the country.  Prospective 
employees are usually graduates of the Pyongyang Senior Middle School No.1, a genius-
training center. 
SSL has developed such programs as Silver Mirror, a remote control program, 
communications, and artificial intelligence software.  SSL also produces several language 
recognition programs and multimedia software, in addition to taking special orders from 
foreign companies [KCNA 98].  The SSL won the championship at the fourth and fifth 
annual FOST Cup World Computer Go Championship competitions held in 1998 and 
1999, respectively [Park 01]. 
  
C. MILITARY DOCTRINE 
In order to provide an accurate representation of the CNO threat posed by North 
Korea, a careful analysis of the DPRK’s current military doctrine should be conducted.  
The Korean People’s Army (KPA) has long had ties to China and the former Soviet 
Union.  China is well known for developing a capable cyber attack program.  It is 
presumed that the KPA and the myriad of North Korean intelligence gathering agencies 
have an understanding of their adversaries’ capabilities if not a rudimentary information 
warfare (IW) capability [BBC 02].  It was reported in 2002 by Richard Clarke, Special 
Advisor to the President for Cyberspace Security under the Clinton and Bush 
administrations, that North Korea was one of the nations “developing information 
warfare units, either in their military, or in their intelligence services, or both” [Clarke 
02]. 
The quantity of the information on North Korea’s military doctrine is sparse, 
however, the KPA’s reported overall objective is to “disturb the coherence of South 
Korean defenses in depth including its key command, control and communications, and 
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intelligence infrastructure” [GS 02].  Although the DPRK has no published official 
doctrine specifically addressing its CNO capabilities or intentions, information gleaned 
from several open source data points implies that CNO is of great interest to the North 
Korean military.  The KPA has expressed a desire to upgrade its existing force 
infrastructure to support the existing strategic objectives of credible deterrence.  This was 
a result of the KPA analyzing recent U.S. military operations in which IT played a major 
role [Minnich 01].  After more than 10 years North Korea resumed high-level military 
talks with Moscow, a move that suggests that the DPRK is attempting to acquire Russian 
hardware and software upgrades.  Kim Jong Il is also an outspoken proponent of 
information technology and is fully aware of the implications associated with the use of 
CNO. 
 
D. TRAINING CYBERWARRIORS 
Determining a state’s participation in CNO activities can prove to be a daunting 
task often times producing dubious results.  Proving the North Korean government’s 
direct or indirect involvement in CNO could prove to be even more difficult given the 
level of secrecy exercised by the Kin Jong Il regime. 
In 1984 during what can be considered as North Korea’s technological revolution, 
the Mirim Academy was established in Pyongyang’s Sadong district.  The academy 
matriculated the top students from the Air Force Academy and other military services for 
an intense two-year program in information technology and electronics warfare.  In 1986 
Mirim Academy officially became a five-year college and was renamed the Mirim 
College and relocated to a new location in the mountainous Hyungjaesan district.  Instead 
of admitting only military service members, the newly formed Mirim College now 
admitted highly intellectual enlisted servicemen and the top percentile high school 
students from each of the country’s provinces.  The North Korean populace now knows 
Mirim College as the Automated Warfare Institute (AWI) or the University of the Gifted.  
It offers such curriculums as command automation, computers, programming, automated 
reconnaissance, and electronic warfare.  Sub-specialties such as computer calculation, 
information transmission, and development of codes are also offered [NIS 02]. 
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South Korean officials have long speculated that the Automated Warfare Institute 
was being used to train and produce a new type of soldier, the cybersoldier.  Since the 
mid 1990’s South Korean military and intelligence officials have been sounding the 
alarm as to the activities at the Automated Warfare Institute.  Since its inception in 1984, 
the Automated Warfare Institute allegedly has been steadily producing up to 100 
cybersoldiers each year, trained in such disciplines as virus creation and network 
penetration [AP 03].  Given the fact that North Korea spends 31.3% of its gross domestic 
product (GDP) on defense, and is working arduously to modernize and digitize its 
military, cyber-warfare does not seem so far fetched. 
In early 2003 South Korea’s Internet service was brought to a near standstill due 
to the introduction of a virus-like computer infection into its network [AP 03].  South 
Korea lacked credible evidence that North Korea was responsible for the denial of service 
attack, but still suspected that the DPRK was responsible.   
It has long been suspected that the Chinese military has been researching ways to 
disrupt targeted military and civilian computer and infrastructure systems using virus 
attacks [Lyman 02].  To assume that China’s technical knowledge of CNA/E was passed 
on to North Korea is not an unfair assumption.  However, we did not uncover any 
evidence of China supplying North Korea with any weapons systems.  China is now 
actively involved in negotiations to halt North Korea’s nuclear weapon development.      
 
E. THE INTERNET AND NORTH KOREAN PROPAGANDA 
 The North Korean government is fully aware of the implication the Internet has 
on modern society.  As it is often reported, Kim Jong Il is a prolific Internet surfer and 
fully understands the impact of getting his message out on the information superhighway. 
There are several websites dedicated to disseminating the Party’s message all of 
which are hosted outside of the DPRK.  The most prominent would be that of the Korean 
Central News Agency (KCNA) (http://www.kcna.co.jp).  Founded in 1946, the news 
agency developed its official website in 2002 for the distribution of North Korean news 
and events.  Although the website is hosted by the Korean News Service (KNS) in 
Tokyo, the KCNA website states that the state-run agency is located in the capital city of 
Pyongyang with branches located all over North Korean and some foreign countries 
[KCNA 03].  The website is overwhelmingly anti-U.S., which is evident by numerous 
articles posted representing the DPRK’s version of world events involving the U.S.  The 
KCNA website also features an extensive archive of articles organized by month dating 
back to December of 1996.   It is readily apparent that the purpose of this website is to 
spread the DPRK’s propaganda to the rest of the free world as the overwhelming majority 
of the country citizenry has no access to the KCNA website. 
 
 
Figure 5.5: KCNA Website  
[From: KCNA 04] 
 
 The People’s Korea (http://210.145.168.243/pk) is another North Korean 
sponsored website that spreads the country’s propaganda abroad.  Located in Tokyo, The 
People’s Korea provides an extensive collection of articles on a wide range of topics.  
There were several important data points gleaned from this website with regard to North 
Korean IT innovations and new products.   
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Figure 5.6: The People’s Korea Website  
[From: TPK 04] 
 
The People’s Korea website also contained a link to the DPRK’s sponsored 
information website, the DPRKorea Infobank (www.dprkorea.com).  The DPRKorea 
Infobank website was launched with the assistance of the Hong Kong based Pan 
Economic Development Association of Korean Nationals in October 1999.  The launch 
was timed to coincide with the 51st anniversary of the founding of the Worker’s Party of 
Korea.  The website provides instant access to government related news on the economy, 
culture, sports, and tourism.  The site also claims to provide an online shopping service 
for Korean books, stamps, and goods. Although the site has been under construction for 




Figure 5.7: DPRKorea Infobank website  
[From: DPRKI 04] 
 
In November 2003 North Korea unveiled its newly developed official website, 
Naenara-DPRK (http://www.kcckp.net/external_e/).  The website was created and is 
managed by the Korean Computer Center (KCC).  Further investigation revealed that the 






Figure 5.8: Naenara-DPRK website  
[From: KCC 03] 
 
F. SUMMARY 
This chapter examined the involvement of the North Korean government in the IT 
sector along with its participation or sponsorship of CNA/E activities.  In addition, North 
Korea’s military doctrine with regard to CNO was examined.  Although no credible 
evidence was found indicating the direct involvement of the DPRK’s government or 
military in CNA/E activities, it would be fair to assume that the DPRK senior leadership 
considers CNO to be an integral component of modern warfare. 
This chapter also discussed the various North Korean government research 
institutions conducting research and development of modern IT products and systems.  
The growth of IT in North Korea was examined and it was found that North Korea’s IT 




VI. COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK/EXPLOITATION 
ACTIVITY 
A. INTRODUCTION 
This chapter examines the CNA/E activities of North Korea.  There have been 
several reports of suspected CNA/E activities being sponsored by North Korea.  This 
chapter aims to verify the validity of these allegations and examine the reported cases of 
CNA/E. 
 
B. COMPUTER NETWORK ATTACK (CNA) 
CNA is a relatively new weapon in the modern warfighter’s arsenal, and can be 
used to inflict significant damage at the speed of light.  CNA is defined as operations to 
disrupt, deny, and degrade information resident in computers and computer networks, or 
the computers and networks themselves.  CNA relies on the data stream to execute an 
attack, for example, the transmission of malicious code to a central processing unit (CPU) 
that causes the computer to short out the power supply thereby rendering the computer 
useless [FM 03].   CNA includes attacks stemming from viruses, worms, and distributed 
denial of service. 
 
C. COMPUTER NETWORK EXPLOITATION (CNE) 
 The first step in carrying out a successful computer network attack is identifying 
the prospective system’s vulnerabilities and then exploiting those vulnerabilities.  
Therefore, CNE is an integral operation in the execution of CNA against an adversary.  
CNE is defined as enabling operations and intelligence collection to gather data from 
target or adversary automated information systems or networks [FM 03]. 
 
D. DIFFICULTIES OF IDENTIFYING NORTH KOREAN HACKERS 
Given the ubiquitous and anonymous nature of the Internet, it is becoming 
unceasingly difficult for law enforcement to properly identify computer attackers and the 
origin of their attacks.  Three techniques used by hackers to cover their tracks are: 
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1. IP Spoofing 
A sophisticated attacker will undoubtedly attempt to conceal his source IP address 
in the performance of an attack. IP spoofing is a technique used to gain unauthorized 
access to computers, whereby the intruder sends messages to a computer with an IP 
address indicating that the message is coming from a trusted host. To engage in IP 
spoofing, a hacker must first use a variety of techniques to find an IP address of a trusted 
host and then modify the packet headers so that it appears that the packets are coming 
from that host [Webop 04].  Therefore, an attacker in North Korea could spoof or hide his 
true IP address making it nearly impossible to verify his true origin.  
 
2. Communication Bouncing 
A North Korean attacker might intentionally bounce his communications through 
several computers in numerous unsuspected countries before reaching his target.  This 
creates a problem for computer forensic investigators in that they will have to re-trace 
and identify all the bounce points to determine the origin of the attack.  In some cases,  
these communications bounce through countries that do not consider computer hacking a 
crime or that are not willing to assist in an investigation. 
 
3. Manipulation of Event Logs 
Most critical systems are usually protected by an intrusion detection system (IDS) 
and maintain an event log of the systems activities.  However, these protection 
mechanisms are far from perfect and an attacker might be able to alter logs after gaining 
unauthorized access to systems, concealing all evidence of their attack. 
 
E. NORTH KOREAN HACKING ACTIVITY 
North Korea has long been suspected of conducting computer network operations 
against other nations, especially South Korea.  However, because North Korea is such a 
closed country, very little is known of the country’s CNO activities. 
Not much is known in the unclassified realm of North Korea’s exploits either 
attempted or succeeded.  There has been widespread speculation that North Korea 
possesses a credible CNO capability, but evidence of such activity is almost non-existent.  
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South Korea, however, is taking the North Korean hacking threat seriously and 
announced in June 2003 that the Defense Security Command (DSC) will be establishing 
a special intelligence-protecting office to cope with the rising threat posed by North 
Korean hackers [APAN 03].  
LT. General Song Young-guen, the commanding general of South Korea’s DSC 
has long been an outspoken voice warning of the North’s cyber warfare capabilities.  In 
early 2003, Young-guen reported that the DPRK was found to be operating a highly 
skilled military unit with the specific mission of hacking into South Korea’s networks 
seeking secret information.  In May 2004 at the 2004 Defense Information Security 
Conference, Young-guen reported that the highly skilled contingent of North Korean 
hackers had been set up under orders from the Supreme Leader Kim Jong Il.  This is the 
first time a South Korean official has publicly confirmed the existence of hacking units in 
the DPRK.  According to Young-guen, the hacking capability of the elite North Korean 
hacking unit is assessed as equivalent to that of the CIA [Jin 04]. 
In March 2003 the Weekly Post (www.weeklypost.com) reported that North 
Korea had approximately 2,000 strategic units comprised of skilled computer hackers 
whose mission is to destroy computer information and communication networks. The 
Weekly Post stated that the 2,000 North Korean cyber terrorists were scattered in South 
Korea, Hong Kong, Russia, and Japan.  According to the Weekly Post, the Japanese 
suspect that the DPRK was involved in a January 25, 2003 cyber attack on South Korean 
and Japanese networks [WP 03]. 
WorldNet Daily alleged that the infamous hacker Kuji who hacked into the Rome 
Air Development Center at Griffiss Air Force Base in New York in 1994 was actually a 
highly trained North Korean hacker [LoBaido 2000].  These allegations proved to be 
false, however, as the true perpetrators of the Rome Air Development Center break-in 
were two young British hackers with no affiliation to North Korea [Ungoed-Thomas 98]. 
During the course of this research no credible evidence was discovered to indicate 
that North Korea was actively participating in any CNA/E activities whether covertly or 
overtly.  However, there was plenty of conjecture and speculation as to the actual CNO 
capabilities and intentions of the DPRK. 
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In an April 2004 telephone interview with Director Baek of South Korea’s 
National Intelligence Service (NIS), Director Baek stated that his organization had no 
knowledge of confirmed CNA/E activities originating from within North Korea.  He also 
stated that the NIS had no evidence of North Korea sponsoring CNA/E activities against 
South Korea or any other country.  Officials at the Korea Information Security Agency 
(KISA), who disclosed that very little is known on the computer network activity of their 
neighbor to the north, also echoed Director Baek’s comments. 
 
F. OBSTACLES ASSOCIATED WITH THE DPRK’S CNA/E ACTIVITES 
Computers are available in minute numbers to the general population of North 
Korea.  Most of the computing power available in the DPRK is hoarded by state run 
research facilities.  In addition, the technical knowledge needed to carry out CNA/E 
activities is not widely possessed outside of the state’s laboratories scattered all over the 
country.   
According to a Nautilus Institute study conducted in October 2002, the DPRK’s 
network access was almost zero due to its lack of a functioning telecommunication 
infrastructure [Hayes 02].  Today, connectivity speeds remain slow and the quality 
remains poor; these factors are certainly not conducive to effectively conducting CNA/E 
operations.  The DPRK is conspicuously absent from a systematic accounting of national 
networked readiness.  North Korea possesses almost none of the factors required for 
achieving a favorable network policy.  Even with the aid of South Korean enterprises, the 
DPRK’s connectivity level remains low due to censorship and limited access to 
computers. 
The absence of stable and continuous electricity throughout the country is a major 
obstacle for North Korea.  North Korea’s electrical grid is antiquated and stretched way 
beyond capacity.  The country spends most of the time in the dark without electricity.  It 
would be extremely difficult to conduct CNA/E operations without reliable power.  
Given the level of sophistication and complexity of the protection software on modern 
computers systems, it often takes hours before an exploitation or attack is successfully 
completed. 
It does not take a lot of processing power to conduct CNA/E operations, although 
supercomputers or high-end Pentium processors can be useful for cracking passwords 
and keys.  However, if North Korea wishes to test the effectiveness of its CNA/E tools on 
computer systems running modern operating systems such as Windows XP© or 
Windows 2000©, it is a requisite that North Korea possesses similar systems running 
similar software.  It has long been suspected that North Korea possesses a limited number 
of Pentium machines.   
In a recent visit to South Korea, North Korean officials demanded the unrestricted 
export of South Korean made Pentium processors to North Korea.  This would suggest 
that the North’s attempt at producing a Pentium equivalent processor has not yet been 
fully achieved.  Several reports have stated that the core of North Korea’s computing 
base is centered on the use of 80386 and 80486 processors. 
 
 
Figure 6.1: Components of Network Readiness  






This chapter discussed the CNA/E activities of North Korea along with some of 
the difficulties associated with determining the source of the activity.  It was determined 
that despite technological advances in the area of IT, North Korea did not pose a serious 
CNO threat given its lack of network readiness.  This chapter also examined the reported 





VII. CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. CONCLUSION 
1. State Sponsored CNO Activities are Often Not Overt 
Researching the activities of a closed society such as North Korea was a difficult 
task.  Additionally, this research was limited to open source information, and the quality 
and quantity of pertinent information was sparse.  When dealing with a country shrouded 
in secrecy such a North Korea, many of the conclusions drawn from available open 
source information is merely speculative.  However, being eager to prove to the world 
that they will not be left behind, North Korea has made publicly available some of its 
current IT research and development projects on state sponsored websites.  It is unclear 
exactly how much of this information is fact or fiction. 
The CNO activities of North Korea are not well documented in open sources.  
Although there has been much speculation by South Korea, we were unable to confirm 
any CNO activity originating in North Korea or sponsored by the government of North 
Korea.  Allegations of computer hacking by North Korea were discovered on the Internet, 
however, the sources failed to mention the specifics of the allegations and these 
allegations proved inconclusive. 
We did not expect to find a “smoking gun” indicating North Korea was actively 
involved in state sponsored cyber warfare.  However, there was an expectation that 
specific data items gleaned from the research conducted would indicate that North Korea 
was at the very least able to conduct CNO, if so desired.  Specifically, the data points 
examined included those of North Korea’s IT infrastructure, electrical infrastructure, and 
the level and pervasiveness of IT education. Evidence was uncovered indicating North 
Korea has a strong desire to conduct research and testing of its CNO capabilities at its 
various research laboratories and universities.  Whether or not the DPRK is ready to 
deploy or have deployed such capabilities remains unknown.  It is important to note 
however, that regardless of whether North Korea possesses the capability to conduct 
CNO against its adversaries, CNO does not appear to be the primary concern among the 
North Korean leadership.  North Korea seems to be developing its IT capability to 
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promote economic growth rather than to attack an adversary’s network.  North Korea’s 
recent request of IT publications from South Korea did not include any publications 
germane to CNO; rather they focused on commercial applications associated with 
fielding IT, such as design, graphics, and animation.  Additionally, the subjects being 
studied by visiting North Korean students at Syracuse University do not include CNO.   
We have shown that North Korea has integrated IT education into its educational 
system, and we have also shown that its military IT education includes virus creation and 
network penetration.  Despite stringent export restrictions, North Korea possesses the 
basic technology needed to conduct CNO.  Furthermore, North Korea possesses the 
connectivity needed to conduct limited CNO against an adversary.  Although no direct 
evidence was uncovered to suggest that North Korea is actively involved in CNO 
activities, we believe that enough credible evidence was uncovered to indicate that North 
Korea possesses the wherewithal to conduct CNO against its adversaries.  
 
2. Technology is a Factor in CNO 
North Korea has developed several computer systems over the years and despite 
import restrictions on dual-use technology has managed to acquire such technologies 
from its allies.  However, the lethality of the CNO activity is not directly proportional to 
the processing power of the systems used in the attacks.  The fact is, very little processing 
power is needed to develop and deploy a lethal virus or worm.  North Korea currently 
possesses sufficient processing capability to develop and deploy such mechanisms.  
However, its limited connectivity and unreliable electrical system could be obstacles to 
deployment. 
North Korea need not develop its own hacking tools, as they are available for sale 
or even for free on the Internet.   However, if North Korea’s CNO capabilities are limited 
to deploying the typical hacker attacks found openly on the Internet, the CNA/E threat 
from North Korea may be of little national interest.  On the other hand, if North Korean 
researchers are developing native viruses and worms for use in their CNO program, the 




3. Education is the Foundation 
The North Korean leadership, particularly Kim Jong Il, recognizes the importance 
of IT education in North Korea.  Starting at the grade level IT education has become 
compulsory throughout North Korea.  In order to produce capable cyber warriors IT 
education has to be an integral part of the overall plan.  The North Korean government 
has impressed upon its populace the importance of IT to the future of the country.  Today, 
being an IT professional is North Korea is viewed as a job of prestige. 
The idea of IT education has not escaped the North Korean military and the 
potential use of CNO as a weapon of mass disruption.  As reported, the Mirim College 
allegedly has been steadily producing at least 100 cybersoldiers each year, trained in such 
areas as virus creation and network penetration.  This highlights the fact that North Korea 
acknowledges the importance of CNO in modern warfare.  However, we did not find any 
evidence of other North Korean schools teaching CNO. 
 
B. RECOMMENDATIONS FOR FUTURE WORK 
1.         China-North Korea Relationship 
Further examination of the relationship between China and North Korea should be 
conducted in order to assess exactly how much IT aid is being provided to North Korea.  
To assume that Chinese developed dual-use technology and IT products are prevalent in 
North Korea is not an unfair assumption.  It is this trade relationship that should be 
further examined.  A determination as to whether Chinese hackers are actively training 
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